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Global Diseases, Global Patents and
Differential Treatment in WTO Law:
Criteria for Suspending Patent
Obligations in Developing Countries
Bradly Condon* and Tapen Sinha
"It is becoming ever more apparent that the patent system isn't working."
-The Economist, November 13, 2004, at 71.
I. INTRODUCTION'
Special and differential treatment of members is a controversial subject
at the World Trade Organization ("WTO") and nowhere is the debate more
pronounced than in the context of life-saving medicines and patent
2protection. However, concerns have been raised in WTO negotiations
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regarding how to ensure that special and differential treatment targets
developing countries' trade, financial and development needs, without
prejudicing the rights of other WTO members. In the fall of 2003, the
WTO adopted a decision to amend the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") in order to enhance
access to essential medicines in developing countries. In the fall of 2004,
the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") adopted an agenda
to further the development of countries by considering different intellectual
property regimes appropriate to the circumstances of a particular country or
region. The WTO and the WIPO are the two major entities working to
develop international patent law, and one of the objectives of TRIPS is to
establish a mutually supportive relationship between the two. 6  The
application of TRIPS to developing countries has become even more
important with the full entry into force of their patent obligations on
January 1, 2005.
The current willingness to take individual circumstances into account
is a significant development. However, while there is recognition of the
Developing Countries, and the Doha "Solution, " 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 47 (2002); James Thuo
Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on Trips and Public Health Under the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 291 (2002); Amir
Attaran, The DOHA Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Access to
Pharmaceuticals, and Options Under WTO Law, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 859 (2002); Laurence R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New
Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2004);
Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in WTO Disputes Settlement: Who Participates?
Who Decides? The Case of TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 7 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 459 (2004); Bryan Mercurio, TRIPs, Patents and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the
Developing World, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 211 (2004); Frederick M. Abbott, The
TRIPS Agreement, Access to Medicines and the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference, (Florida
State University College of Law, Public Law Working Paper No. 36, 2001) (Quaker U.N.
Office, Occasional Paper No. 7, Oct. 2001), at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=285934 (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
3 See, e.g., WTO Comm. on Trade & Dev. (CTD), Realizing Trade and Development
Objectives Through Special and Differential Treatment: Submission by Canada, 6, 23,
TN/CTD/W21 (Dec. 6, 2002); CTD, The WTO Work Program on Special and Differential
Treatment: Communication from the European Communities, 5-6, TN/CTDI/W26 (Dec.
11, 2002) [hereinafter Communication from the European Communities]; CTD, Remarks of
the United States Delegation in the Committee on Trade and Developmental Special Session
on Special and Differential Treatment, 14 JUNE 2002, 9, TNICTDIW/9 (June 28, 2002).
4 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M.
1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
5 Press Release, WIPO, Member States Agree to Further Examine Proposal on
Development (Oct. 4, 2004), available at http://www.wipo.int/wilma/pressinfo-en/200410/
msg00l .html.
6 TRIPS pmbl.
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need to adopt special and differential treatment to the individual
circumstances of WTO members, the negotiations have not made much
progress in determining the criteria that should be applied . The rationale
for introducing greater flexibility in the application of special and
differential treatment is that differentiation amongst developing country
members is necessary if special and differential treatment is to be made
effective and targeted.8  The issue of how to define developing countries
has also been raised in this context, although there has been disagreement
regarding whether this falls within the negotiating mandate. 9 Paragraph 44
of the Doha Ministerial Declaration established the mandate for
negotiations on special and differential treatment for the Doha Round, in
reaffirming that "provisions for special and differential treatment are an
integral part of the WTO Agreements" and directing that "all special and
differential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and
operational."'  In WTO negotiations in the Committee on Trade and
7 See, e.g., Communication from the European Communities, supra note 3, 6; CTD,
Approach to Facilitate Deliberation on the Agreement-specific S&D Proposals:
Communication from the United States, 5, TN/CTD/W/27 (Feb. 13, 2003); CTD, Special
Session on Special and Differential Treatment: Communication from Switzerland to the CTD
in Special Session, 6, TN/CTD/W/l (Sept. 13, 2002); CTD, Submission for the Committee
on Trade and Development - Special Session on Special and Differential Treatment:
Communication from the European Communities, 14, TN/CTD/W/13 (Aug. 1, 2002).
8 CTD, Draft Report to the General Council, 13, TN/CTDIW/25 (Dec. 6, 2002).
9 Id.
10 The Draft Report stated that:
Ministers... endorsed the Work Programme on special and differential treatment set out in
the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, and as per paragraph 12.1 of
the Decision directed the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD):
(i) to identify those special and differential treatment provisions that are already mandatory
in nature and those that are non-binding in character, to consider the legal and practical
implications for developed and developing Members of converting special and differential
treatment measures into mandatory provisions, to identify those that Members consider
should be made mandatory, and to report to the General Council with clear recommendations
for a decision by July 2002;
(ii) to examine additional ways in which special and differential treatment provisions can be
made more effective, to consider ways, including improved information flows, in which
developing countries, in particular the least-developed countries, may be assisted to make
best use of special and differential treatment provisions, and to report to the General Council
with clear recommendations for a decision by July 2002; and
(iii) to consider, in the context of the Work Program adopted at the Fourth Session of the
Ministerial Conference, how special and differential treatment may be incorporated into the
architecture of WTO rules.
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Development, introducing the concept of "situational flexibility," or
"member-specific flexibility," into special and differential treatment of
developing countries has become a matter of debate.11 In the context of
TRIPS, the concept of situational flexibility is particularly relevant to the
issue of extending transition periods 2 and striking the appropriate balance
between the rights of producers and users of intellectual property. 13 Least-
developed countries in particular want to strengthen special and differential
treatment measures in TRIPS.'
4
In this article, several WTO mechanisms for implementing special and
differential treatment in TRIPS with respect to pharmaceutical patents are
analyzed. We challenge conventional economic views regarding the
relationship between international intellectual property law and research
incentives to invent medicines to treat global diseases in developing
countries. In our analysis of the economics of pharmaceutical patents, we
will distinguish between global diseases (which occur in both developed
and developing countries) and neglected diseases (which occur
overwhelmingly in developing countries, rather than in developed
countries). 15  In other parts of our analysis, we will use the term
"developing country diseases" to refer to both neglected and global
diseases.
See id. 1. In pursuance of this mandate the Trade Negotiations Committee ("TNC"), in its
meeting held from January 28 through February 1, 2002, agreed that "the review of all
special and differential treatment provisions with a view to strengthening them and making
them more precise, effective and operational provided for in paragraph 44 of the Ministerial
Declaration shall be carried out by the Committee on Trade and Development in Special
Sessions." Id.
11 See CTD, 18th Sess., Note on the Meeting of 7 December 2004, 8, TN/CTD/M/18
(Jan. 27, 2005); CTD, 17th Sess., Note on the Meeting of 28 October 2004, 7,
TN/CTD/M/17 (Dec. 7, 2004).
12 See TRIPS arts. 65-66. It is important to note that Article 66.1 envisages extensions of
the transition period for least-developed countries, whereas Article 65 does not envisage
extensions for developing countries. The negotiating history of TRIPS appears to confirm
that the intention of the parties was to restrict extensions to the least-developed countries.
See Note by the Secretariat, Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, 34, MTN.GNG/NG 11/21 (June 22,
1990) [hereinafter Note by the Secretariat]. In the Uruguay Round negotiations on TRIPS, a
country-by-country or case-by-case approach to transition periods was rejected on the basis
that such an approach would be difficult to negotiate. Id. 8.
13 See TRIPS arts. 7-8. See also CTD, Special and Differential Treatment Provisions:
Joint Communication from the African Group in the WTO, TT 18-19, TN/CTD/W/28 (Feb.
14, 2003).
14 CTD, Special and Differential Treatment Conditions: Joint Communication by the
Least-Developed Countries, T 18, TN/CTD/W/4 (May 24, 2002).
'5See Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in
International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 193 (2005)
(noting the difference between global and neglected diseases).
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We present a new analytical framework for determining differential
treatment of developing and least-developed countries and apply this
framework in the context of TRIPS.16 We propose that the balance of legal
rights between producers and users of patents be determined on a market-
by-market basis, rather than on a global basis, and that criteria for doing so
be developed.
In this article, an overview of key TRIPS obligations and exceptions
relating to patents, as amended to date by the Doha Round negotiations is
provided. Part III analyzes how WTO provisions on special and differential
treatment of developing countries should be applied to TRIPS law and
policy, taking into account the 2004 Appellate Body ruling in European
Communities - Tariff Preferences for Developing Countries. Part IV
analyzes the consistency of global patent rights with the economic and
developmental objectives of the WTO and shows how strong patent rights
in developing countries contradict these objectives. Part V then analyzes
whether TRIPS is amenable to an interpretation that would achieve a more
appropriate balance between the rights of producers and users of patented
pharmaceuticals and shows that an amendment to TRIPS to facilitate the
use of compulsory licensing in developing and least-developed countries is
a solution. However, a better solution is to grant waivers for developing
countries and extensions of the transition period for least-developed
countries. This article proposes a set of measurable criteria to implement
special and differential treatment of countries with respect to
pharmaceutical patents on a market-by-market basis using these two
mechanisms. Equal access to life-saving medicines requires equal access to
legal rights that affect that access.
II. KEY TRIPS EXCEPTIONS RELATING TO PATENTS
TRIPS requires patents to provide patent owners with the exclusive
right to prevent third parties from making, using, selling or importing a
patented product without the owner's consent. Articles 30 and 31
authorize exceptions to these rights. These two articles thus play a key role
in balancing the rights of patent owners against the needs of consumers of
patented products, whether they be pharmaceuticals or other patented
products. The ability to manufacture drugs under compulsory license
provides developing countries with bargaining power to extract price
concessions for patented drugs or to issue compulsory licenses when
negotiations fail. However, this bargaining power applies only to countries
16 Our focus is on differential treatment, as opposed to differential pricing, of drugs. For
a discussion of the latter issue in the context of TRIPS, see Peter J. Hammer, Differential
Pricing of Essential AIDS Drugs: Markets, Politics and Public Health, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L.
883 (2002).
17 TRIPS art. 28.1.
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that have the capacity to produce generic drugs under compulsory licenses
issued to government laboratories or private generic producers. Countries
that lack domestic manufacturing capacity would need to be able to import
generics manufactured under compulsory licenses in other countries in
order to enjoy a comparable level of bargaining power. This section will
discuss Article 30 first, followed by Article 31, and consider how effective
these articles are in ensuring that governments can issue compulsory
licenses to meet national needs, including with respect to public health
problems.
A. TRIPS Article 30
TRIPS Article 30 permits "limited exceptions" to patent rights.
Academic opinions diverge over whether Article 30 can be interpreted to
permit generic exports.' 8 If one accepts the interpretation of Article 30 in
Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,19 Article 30 does
not permit such exports. However, if one rejects that interpretation, there is
nothing in the wording of Article 30 to prevent such an interpretation.
Article 30 establishes three criteria, each of which must be satisfied in
order to qualify for the exception: (1) the exception must be "limited"; (2)
the exception must not "unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation
of the patent"; and (3) the exception must not "unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking into account the legitimate
interests of third parties." The panel ruled that each of the three must be
presumed to mean something different from the other two or else there
would be redundancy.2 °
In Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, the panel
considered whether the Canadian Patent Act violated TRIPS by permitting
18 Several commentators have suggested that Article 30 be interpreted to allow generic
exports to poor countries that lack manufacturing capacity. See, e.g., Andrea M. Curti, The
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: An Unlikely Weapon in the Fight Against AIDS, 27
AM. J.L. & MED. 469 (2001); Grace K. Avedissian, Comment, Global Implications of a
Potential US. Policy Shift Toward Compulsory Licensing of Medical Inventions in a New
Era of "Super-Terrorism," 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 237 (2002); Divya Murthy, The Future
of Compulsory Licensing: Deciphering the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and
Public Health, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1299 (2002).
19 WTO Panel Report on E.C. Complaint Concerning Canada - Patent Protection of
Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS 1 14/R (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Canada - Patent
Protection of Pharmaceutical Products]. Amir Attaran argues that Article 30 does not
provide the best means for implementing Paragraph 6 of the TRIPS Declaration, due to the
interpretation given to this article by the panel in Canada - Patent Protection of
Pharmaceutical Products. See Attaran, supra note 2, at 872. For an excellent critique of the
panel's interpretation of Article 30, see Jonathan Michael Berger, Tripping Over Patents:
AIDS, Access to Treatment and the Manufacturing of Scarcity, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 157
(2002).
20 See Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, supra note 19.
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generic manufacturers to infringe patent rights (1) to develop submissions
for regulatory approval in Canada or a foreign country (the regulatory
review exception) and (2) to manufacture and stockpile a patented product
during the final six months of the patent in preparation for sale after the
patent expires (the stockpiling exception). The panel's decision thus
examined the legality under TRIPS of two well-recognized exceptions to
patent protection. The panel accepted the argument of the European
Communities that both exceptions violated the "exclusionary" patent rights
set out in TRIPS Article 28. Canada defended both exceptions under
TRIPS Article 30. The panel ruled that the regulatory review exception
passed the Article 30 test but the stockpiling exception did not.
In rejecting the stockpiling exception, the panel ruled that any
exception that entirely removes the right to exclude making and using the
patented product cannot be considered a "limited exception" under Article
30. In contrast, the regulatory review exception created a minimal
reduction in the legal rights of the patentee and therefore qualified as a
"limited exception." The regulatory review exception allowed a generic
manufacturer to produce a limited quantity of patented drugs to submit to a
national regulatory review process. The regulatory review exception was
confined to conduct needed to comply with the requirements of the
regulatory review process, and no commercial use was made of the products
resulting from the production runs. Thus, the acts permitted would be small
and narrowly bounded. The economic impact of this regulatory review
exception could be considerable. Since it could take generic producers
several years to develop the generic product and to obtain regulatory
approval, permitting these activities during the course of the patent could
significantly reduce the length of time that the patent owner would enjoy a
monopoly in the market and thereby reduce profits. However, the panel
reasoned that the first condition of Article 30 addresses the impact on legal
rights, not economic impact.
The panel further reasoned that the regulatory review exception did not
conflict with the normal exploitation of patents. The regulatory review
process is an unintended consequence of the conjunction of patent laws
with product laws, not a normal consequence of enforcing patent rights.
Unlike many other kinds of patentable products, pharmaceuticals are
subject to rigorous government scrutiny due to their potential to cause
serious harm to human health through unintended side effects. Thus, patent
owners cannot claim a "legitimate interest" in the economic benefits caused
by the length of time required to get regulatory approval for generic drugs.
While a number of governments had extended the patent term to
compensate for the delays in obtaining approval, several others had not.
Therefore, the interest claimed was neither so compelling nor so widely
recognized that it could be regarded as a "legitimate interest." Moreover,
the issue of regulatory review exceptions was well known before the TRIPS
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negotiations, but was not addressed in the recorded agenda of the
negotiations. Does this interpretation of the Article 30 exception stand in
the way of issuing compulsory licenses on HIV/AIDS drugs exclusively for
export or would that be too great an intrusion on patent rights to qualify as a
limited exception? Such a license would not affect the economic interests
of the patent holder in the market in which it is issued. Nor would it affect
its legal rights or economic interests in the export market if that market is a
least-developed country that will not provide patent protection until 2016.
However, if one follows the reasoning of the panel, it would abrogate
entirely the right to exclude making and using the patented product in
protected markets and therefore fail the first test under Article 30 for the
same reason as the stockpiling exception.
In addition to the panel interpretation, there are other reasons to
conclude that Article 31, not Article 30, is the appropriate provision with
respect to compulsory licenses to address public health problems. First,
with the decision to amend Article 31 (discussed below), the WTO
members have rejected the interpretation of Article 30 as a means to resolve
the issue of compulsoY licensing for countries that lack adequate
manufacturing capacity.2  Second, the negotiating history of TRIPS
indicates that Article 31 was intended to govern compulsory licensing.
22
Finally, interpreting Article 30 to resolve compulsory licensing issues
would be problematic. While it would provide greater certainty regarding
the rights of WTO members, it would introduce a new element of
uncertainty regarding the correct interpretation of Article 30 in other
circumstances and the relationship between Articles 30 and 31.
B. TRIPS Article 31
Under Article 31, a government may issue a compulsory license
authorizing the government or a third party to produce generic drugs
without the authorization of the patent holder where negotiations fail to
obtain authorization on reasonable commercial terms.23 However, the use
of the patent must be "predominantly" to supply the domestic market 24 and
21 The European Union had suggested that, in the absence of an agreement to amend
Article 31 (f), it would favor adopting an interpretation of Article 30 that would allow WTO
members to permit the manufacture of generic drugs without the patent holder's permission
for export to another country that is facing a serious public health problem. See WTO
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Concept Paper
Relating to Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health: Communication from the European Communities and their Member States, 23-
24, IP/C/W/339 (Mar. 4, 2002).
22 See Note by the Secretariat, supra note 12, 13, 21-22. The discussion regarding
Article 27 of the U.S. proposal refers to a precursor of Article 31, not Article 30.
23 TRIPS art. 3 1(b).
24 Id. at art. 3 1(f).
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the patent holder must be paid adequate remuneration, based on the
economic value of the license. 25  The negotiation requirement may be
waived in cases of national emergency, extreme urgency, or non-
commercial public use.26 Members are not obliged to comply with the
negotiation requirement or to predominantly serve the domestic market
where the use is permitted to remedy anti-competitive practices.
27
The TRIPS provisions relating to compulsory licensing strengthen a
government's position in price negotiations with patent holders by
permitting the government to issue a compulsory license to manufacture
drugs, rather than purchase them from the patent owner. For example,
where a government provides drugs to patients through a public healthcare
scheme, it meets the necessary conditions to halt price negotiations because
generic versions manufactured under compulsory license would serve a
non-commercial public use 28 and predominantly supply the domestic
market. Since the term "adequate remuneration" is not defined, patent
owners cannot predict with certainty what compensation they will receive if
a government abandons negotiations. 29 This gives the patent owners an
incentive to determine the price through negotiation.
Many developing countries do not have the capacity to manufacture
generic drugs. This weakens their bargaining position substantially unless
they can import generic drugs from another country that has issued a
compulsory license on their behalf. To serve as an effective bargaining
25 Id. at art. 3 1(h).
26 Id. at art. 3 1(b).
27 Id. at art. 31 (k).
28 TRIPS Article 31 (b) contemplates non-commercial public use by "the government or a
contractor" and a patent "used by or for the government." See id. at art. 3 1(b). Thus, in the
context of Article 31 (b), a reasonable interpretation of the term "non-commercial public use"
would include issuing a compulsory license on patented pharmaceuticals for their
manufacture by the government, or by a contractor on behalf of the government, for public
distribution through a government health-care system.
29 Calculating compensation for compulsory licenses is likely to be an uncertain process
in any legal system. Since TRIPS permits the process for calculating remuneration to differ
from one WTO member to the next, uncertainty increases in the international context.
TRIPS Article 31(h) requires that "the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in
the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the [compulsory
license]." TRIPS art. 31(h). Article 31(k) allows "the need to correct anti-competitive
practices" to be taken into account in determining the amount of remuneration. Id. at art.
3 1(k). Article 3 1(j) requires that "any decision relating to remuneration ... shall be subject
to judicial review or other independent review ... in that Member." Id. at art. 3 1(j). Article
I provides that "[m]embers shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing [TRIPS] within their own legal system and practice." Id. at art. 1. The general
nature of these compensation obligations, together with the flexibility permitted under
Article 1, means that the specific manner in which compensation is determined may vary
from one WTO member to the next, as may the principles that apply to judicial review or its
equivalent in each legal system.
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chip, the threat to issue a compulsory license to government or private
pharmaceutical manufacturers must be credible. TRIPS Declaration
Paragraph 6 acknowledged the difficulties countries with inadequate
manufacturing capacity would face with respect to compulsory licensing:
6. We recognize that WTO members with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face
difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the
TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an
expeditious solution to this problem .. 30
C. The Paragraph 6 Decision
In order to implement Paragraph 6, the WTO General Council agreed
to amend Articles 31 (f) and 31 (h) by means of a Decision that sets up a new
set of rights and obligations, adding to the pre-existing rights and
obligations set out in the TRIPS agreement. 31  We shall refer to this
Decision of August 30, 2003 as the "Paragraph 6 Decision" and the new set
of rights and obligations as the "Paragraph 6 System."
The Paragraph 6 Decision aims to increase the availability of
pharmaceutical products needed to address public health problems in
developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics. 32 Because the text of
TRIPS Article 31(f) was clear, WTO members had to agree to an
amendment in order to facilitate access to essential medicines in developing
and least-developed countries that have inadequate manufacturing
capacities. It was not possible to solve the problem through treaty
interpretation.
The Paragraph 6 Decision waives an exporter's Article 31 (f) obligation
to supply predominantly to the domestic market, enabling any country with
manufacturing capacity to issue a compulsory license to produce generic
drugs for export to countries that have insufficient or no manufacturing
capacity, subject to several conditions.33 Article 3 1(h) requires the issuer of
30 WTO Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, adopted on Nov. 14, 2001, 6, WT/M1N(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter
TRIPS Declaration].
31 See WTO General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Decision of 30 August 2003, 11, WT/L/540
(Sept. 2, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/trips-e/implem-
para6_- e.htm ("This Decision, including the waivers granted in it, shall terminate for each
Member on the date on which an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement replacing its
provisions takes effect for that Member.") [hereinafter Paragraph 6 Decision].
32 Id. 1(a); TRIPS Declaration, supra note 30, 1.
33Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 31, 2.
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a compulsory license to compensate the patent holder. The amendment
clarifies that in the situation where the license is issued to serve an export
market under the Paragraph 6 system (as opposed to serving the domestic
market), the exporting country, not the importing country, must pay
compensation.34 The comensation takes into account the economic value
in the importing country.3 No formal restriction on the countries that are
eligible to import exists under the Paragraph 6 system. 36  However, the
Paragraph 6 Decision creates four categories of importing members. Least-
developed countries are eligible to import without formal notification to the
WTO. Two further categories consist of countries that have made a
commitment not to use the Paragraph 6 system as importers38 and countries
that have committed to using the system as importers only in situations of
national emergency or extreme urgency.39 Countries making the latter
commitment have agreed, in effect, not to use the system for non-
commercial public use. For example, they have agreed not to use the
system simply to lower the general cost of purchasing medicine for public
health care systems. These commitments resolve an issue of concern to the
pharmaceutical industry-that countries that lacked manufacturing
capacity, but could afford to pay the full price of patented medicine, would
import cheaper generic versions instead. The fourth category consists of the
members that do not fall into the first three categories.
34 Id. 3. Normally, the country issuing a compulsory license would do so to supply its
own market.
35 Id. As we note above, calculating this compensation will be a difficult task. As we note
below, the value of the market may be very little in the poorest countries, particularly where
the patent holders were already selling the product at cost.361 Id. 1 (b).
37 All other members are required to notify the Council for TRIPS of its intention to use
the system set out in the Paragraph 6 Decision; the notification is not subject to WTO
approval. See id.
38 This covers most, but not all, developed countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, and the United States. See id. at n.3; Note from the Chairman, Council for
TRIPS, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health (Aug. 27, 2003), available at
http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/docs/TRIPS-para6_16-12-02.pdf.
39 The Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Slovak Republic and Slovenia all agreed to limit their use of the system as importers to
emergencies until their accession to the European Union, when they will opt out as importers
entirely. See The General Council's Chairperson's statement, WTO NEWS, (WTO, Geneva),
Aug. 27, 2003, at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news03-e/ trips-stat_28aug03 e.htm
(The Chairman's Note is carefully negotiated over several months). Other Members that
have agreed to such limited use as importers are Hong Kong, China, Israel, Korea, Kuwait,
Macao China, Mexico, Qatar, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Turkey, and the United Arab
Emirates. Id.
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In order to ensure that imports occur only within the parameters set out
in the Paragraph 6 Decision and that medicines supplied under this system
do not make their way back to markets that have been carved out of the
system under these commitments, members must have laws in place to
prevent the diversion of medicine supplied under the system. 0  All
importing countries, regardless of their development status, must also take
"reasonable measures within their means, proportionate to their
administrative capacities and to the risk of trade diversion" to prevent the
re-export of the products they import under this system.4' The types of
measures that they must take are not specified. Where developing countries
and least-developed countries experience difficulty implementing this
provision, developed countries must provide technical and financial
assistance to facilitate its implementation.42 However, WTO members are
free to determine whether to permit parallel imports without these laws
being subject to WTO dispute settlement procedures.43 Parallel imports
involve products sold by the patent owner in one market and then imported
into another market without the patent owner's approval.
No restrictions exist regarding the countries that are eligible to export.
However, exporters are required to follow a series of procedural
requirements and conditions, in addition to the compensation requirement
noted above. Moreover, the obligations under Article 31 (f) are waived only
"to the extent necessary for the purposes of production of a pharmaceutical
40 Paragraph 5 provides as follows:
Members shall ensure the availability of effective legal means to prevent the importation
into, and sale in, their territories of products produced under the system set out in this
Decision and diverted to their markets inconsistently with its provisions, using the means
already required to be available under the TRIPS Agreement. If any Member considers that
such measures are proving insufficient for this purpose, the matter may be reviewed in the
Council for TRIPS at the request of that Member.
Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 31, 5.
41 Id. f4.
42 id.
43 TRIPS art. 6; see also TRIPS Declaration, supra note 30, 5(d) ("The effect of the
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual
property rights is to leave each Member free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion
without challenge, subject to the MFN and national treatment provisions of Articles 3 and
4.") Under a system of international exhaustion of patents, the patent owner cannot prevent
the importation of his own product from a foreign country once it has been sold there; that is,
parallel imports. For example, if American drug company Merck sells AIDS drugs in
Mexico for half the price it charges for the same drug in the United States, an American
consumer might import the drug from Mexico rather than purchase it in the United States.
This importation is known as a parallel import. TRIPS permits the United States (and other
WTO members) to decide for itself whether to permit or prohibit American consumers from
importing the drugs.
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product(s) and its export to an eligible importing Member(s). 44 A further
necessity test requires that the license restrict the authorization to "only the
amount necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing Member(s). 45
Under the Paragraph 6 system, with the exception of least-developed
countries, importing countries must specify the names and quantities of the
products needed in their notification to the WTO.46 They must also confirm
that they have granted or intend to grant a compulsory license in accordance
with TRIPS Article 31.47  Finally, they must establish that they have
insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector for
the product in question in one of two ways. Either they have no
manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector at all, or they have
examined this capacity (excluding that owned or controlled by the patent
holder) and found it to be insufficient to meet their needs.48 The Paragraph
6 system will no longer apply once it is established that the capacity has
become sufficient to meet its needs.49
The Paragraph 6 system does not apply to countries that have
sufficient manufacturing capacity to issue compulsory licenses to meet the
needs of their own populations. The question in a given case is whether the
importing country has manufacturing capacity for the pharmaceutical
product in question. For example, countries like China, India and Brazil
could use the Paragraph 6 system to import drugs from generic
manufacturers in other countries if they lack capacity for a particular
medicine. However, where developing countries do have manufacturing
capacity, they will have to determine whether and how to use compulsory
licensing to reduce the cost of providing treatment by issuing licenses to
their own generic manufacturers. When a country issues a compulsory
license to its own generic drug manufacturers to serve its own market, the
Paragraph 6 Decision will not apply. In order to strike the right balance
between the rights of producers and users of patented drugs, the country
must rely on TRIPS Article 31 exceptions, which continue to operate in this
situation, unchanged by the Paragraph 6 Decision. Many of these
exceptions are more ambiguous than paragraph 31 (f), thus raising the issue
of whether they need clarification or amendments to enhance access to
essential medicine in these countries. The focus of the remainder of this
article is on the application of TRIPS Article 31 to compulsory licenses
issued in developing countries that have sufficient generic manufacturing
capacity to meet their own needs without importing generic drugs under the




48 Id. 2(a)(ii), Annex.
49 Id. at Annex.
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Paragraph 6 system.50
III. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN WTO LAW AND
POLICY
Special and differential treatment of developing countries is a concept
that finds expression throughout WTO law. This section proposes three
tests to determine whether WTO law-and TRIPS patent provisions in
particular-achieves its stated objective(s) with respect to developing
countries. The first test is based on the development needs of WTO
members. The second test is based on the economic impact of WTO
provisions on developing countries. The third test asks whether the
interpretation or design of the law is effective. Applying this analysis to
TRIPS supports the view that the balance to be struck between producers
and users of patented medicine should shift in favor of developing and
least-developed countries when they are the users under consideration.
The conventional view of treaty interpretation is that legal rights and
obligations must be interpreted in a uniform manner for all of the parties to
the treaty. However, this view does not prevent taking the individual
circumstances of member States into account where the text of the treaty
supports such an interpretation. The Decision of November 28, 1979 on
Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries (L/4903)5 (the "Enabling Clause")
introduced special and differential treatment as an "integral part of the
GATT system., 52 The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
50 All developing countries were required to comply fully with TRIPS by January 1,
2005. TRIPS allowed least-developed countries and developing countries to delay providing
patent protection for pharmaceuticals. Least-developed countries could delay intellectual
property protection generally until 2006, while developing countries could do so until 2000.
TRIPS arts. 66.1, 65.2. With respect to patents however, developing countries could delay
protection until 2005 if they did not provide patent protection for a particular area of
technology when TRIPS obligations came into effect in 1995. Id. at art. 65.4. Less than
twenty developing countries fit this description, but they include Brazil and India. See
WORLD HEALTH ORG. & WTO, WTO AGREEMENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH n.13 (2002),
available at http://www.who.int/media/homepage/en/who wtoe.pdf. The transition period
for least-developed countries under Article 66.1 was subsequently extended an additional ten
years for pharmaceutical products. See WTO Council for TRIPS, Extension of the Transition
Period under Article 661 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members
for Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products: Decision of the Council
for TRIPS of 27June 2002, IP/C/25 (July 1, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop..e/trips-e/art66 1_e.htm.
51 GATT Secretariat, Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries: Decision of 28 November 1979, L/4903 (Dec.
4, 1979), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal-e/tokyo.enablinge.pdf
[hereinafter Differential and More Favorable Treatment]
52 Director-General of GATT, GATT: THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 99 (1979).
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then incorporated several more provisions regarding special and differential
treatment into WTO law. The legal effect of WTO provisions referring to
special and differential treatment for developing countries varies with their
wording and the context in which they appear. Nevertheless, special and
differential treatment for developing countries is a concept that now finds
expression throughout WTO law and supports the view that economic
inequality can and should be taken into account in the design or
interpretation of WTO rights.
In European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff
Preferences to Developing Countries (the "Tariff Preferences case"), the
WTO Appellate Body stated:
[T]he Preamble to the WTO Agreement, which informs all the covered
agreements including the GATT 1994... explicitly recognizes the
"need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries,
and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the
growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development." The word "commensurate" in this phrase
appears to leave open the possibility that developing countries may have
different needs according to their levels of development and particular
circumstances. The Preamble to the WTO Agreement further
recognizes that Members' "respective needs and concerns at different
levels of economic development" may vary according to the different
stages of development of different Members.
[W]e read paragraph 3(c) [of the Enabling Clause] as authorizing
preference-granting countries to "respond positively" to "needs" that are
not necessarily common or shared by all developing countries.
Responding to the "needs of developing countries" may thus entail
treating different developing-country beneficiaries differently.
[T]he existence of a "development, financial [or] trade need" must be
assessed according to an objective standard. Broad-based recognition
of a particular need, set out in the WTO Agreement or in multilateral
instruments adopted by international organizations, could serve as such
a standard.53
In the Tariff Preferences case, the Appellate Body recognized that the
equal application of certain obligations, regardless of economic status,
53 WTO Appellate Body Report Concerning European Communities-Conditions for the
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, 161-63, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr.
7, 2004) [hereinafter EC Tariff Preferences]. Regarding the Preamble to the WTO
Agreement, see Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (1994),
33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
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could run counter to the WTO objective of promoting economic
development through trade:
We thus understand that, between the entry into force of the GATT and
the adoption of the Enabling Clause, the Contracting Parties determined
that the MFN obligation failed to secure adequate market access for
developing countries so as to stimulate their economic development.
Overcoming this required recognition by the multilateral trading system
that certain obligations, applied to all Contracting Parties, could impede
rather than facilitate the objective of ensuring that developing countries
secure a share in the growth of world trade.54
Switzerland has expressed a similar view in the Doha Round
negotiations on special and differential treatment:
The multilateral trading system is based upon the principle of non-
discrimination. Yet, if common rules affect Members in substantially
different ways, it might be necessary to modify the application of a rule
or create a special rule in order not to discriminate against certain
Members. Equal treatment of Members with fundamental differences of
starting positions is not conducive to creating a competitive edge for and
to fostering the trade interests of those-the poorest-who need it
most.
55
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires contextual
WTO rule interpretation.5 6 Article 31 requires that the ordinary meaning be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose. The approach taken by the Appellate Body has been to first
examine the context of the provision in which the language is expressed,
then examine the context of the particular agreement in which the provision
is found, and, lastly, examine the context of the Uruguay Round
Agreements as a whole. Although it provides no binding right or
obligation, the WTO preamble sets out the object and purpose of the trade
agreements and provides an overall context in which to interpret trade
obligations and exceptions, including those found in TRIPS. It thus directly
affects interpretation as part of the single combined operation of Article 31.
In Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, the Appellate Body made the
following general statement about the interpretation of WTO rules:
WTO rules are not so rigid or so inflexible as not to leave room for
14 Id. 109.
55 CTD, Special Session on Special and Differential Treatment: Communication from
Switzerland to the CTD in Special Session, 6, TN/CTD/W/14 (Sept. 13, 2002).
56 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm.
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reasoned judgments in confronting the endless and ever-changing ebb
and flow of real facts in real cases in the real world. They will serve the
multilateral trading system best if they are interpreted with that in
mind."
The asymmetries of economic development that exist among the
member States need to be addressed in order to ensure the effectiveness of
special and differential treatment in WTO law. These need to be taken into
account not only in the design of the rules but also with respect to their
interpretation.
The preamble of the WTO Agreement indicates that the objective of
special and differential treatment for developing countries is "to ensure that
developing countries, especially the least developed among them, secure a
share in the growth of international trade commensurate with the needs of
their economic development."58 According to the preamble, achieving this
objective requires a consideration of their "respective needs and concerns at
different levels of economic development." This objective applies to all of
the covered agreements. 59 Therefore, the provisions in the WTO preamble
inform the interpretation of TRIPS. The following analysis develops a
framework for analyzing special and differential treatment provisions,
including the references in the WTO preamble, before considering how the
preamble should inform the interpretation of specific TRIPS provisions.
The Appellate Body's decision in European Communities -
Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries
recognizes that the references to the needs of developing countries in the
WTO Agreement preamble support the view that they "may have different
needs according to their levels of development and particular
circumstances." However, variation in levels of development is only one
factor to take into account in determining the legal and economic effects of
special and differential treatment provisions. The needs of developing
countries and the impact of special and differential treatment on their
development both vary depending on the economic context of each WTO
agreement. Likewise, variations in the interpretative context of special and
differential treatment provisions must be taken into account in determining
their legal effect in different agreements. 60 Thus, the legal and economic
effects of special and differential treatment provisions will vary with the
legal and economic context of each agreement.
57 WTO Appellate Body Report Concerning Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
6.35, WT/DS8/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996).
58 TRIPS pmbl.
59 EC Tariff Preferences, supra note 53, 161; see also Steve Charnovitz et al., The
Appellate Body's GSP Decision, 3 WORLD TRADE REv. 239, 239-65 (2004), available at
http://joumals.cambridge.org.
60 Vienna Convention, supra note 56, at art. 31.
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For example, the central thrust of GATT is to reduce tariffs and other
barriers to trade (the legal context) 61 in order to stimulate economic growth
through specialization in areas of comparative advantage (the economic
context). 6T GATT seeks to remove barriers to competition. In contrast,
TRIPS promotes intellectual property rights (the legal context) 63 in order to
stimulate economic growth through innovation (the economic context).64
TRIPS seeks to protect monopoly rights. In the context of GATT,
economic development is based on market access for products in which
developing countries enjoy a comparative advantage. In the context of
TRIPS, economic development is based on access to technology. The
nature of the rules and their underlying economic theories are different in
these two agreements.
Since the legal and economic contexts of GATT and TRIPS are not the
same and all developing countries are not the same, there cannot be special
and differential treatment that is universally appropriate for all (1) covered
agreements or (2) developing countries. Moreover, the context of special
and differential treatment varies within each of the covered agreements. For
example, both the legal and economic contexts in TRIPS will vary between
different types of intellectual property rights (for example, patents versus
geographical indications) and within categories of intellectual property right
(for example, patents for medicine versus patents for computer technology).
This raises the issue of how to determine the appropriate level of
special and differential treatment and the correct interpretation and
application of special and differential treatment provisions from one
agreement to the next. The basic purpose of special and differential
treatment is to stimulate sustainable economic development in accordance
with the needs of developing countries.65  Thus, both the needs of
developing countries and the economic impact of special and differential
treatment on their development should be taken into account (1) when
interpreting special and differential treatment provisions and (2) when
61 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, pmbl., 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
62 See, e.g., DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION
(3d. ed. 1821); Eli Heckscher, Utrikeshandelns verkan pa inkomstfordelningen [The Effect of
Foreign Trade on the Distribution of Income], 21 EKONOMISK TIDSKRIFT 497 (1919).
63 TRIPS pmbl.
64 See, e.g., JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Redvers
Opie trans., 1934); ROBERT M. SOLow, GROWTH THEORY: AN EXPOSITION (1988); Paul
Romer, Crazy Explanations for the Productivity Slowdown, in NBER MACROECONOMICS
ANNUAL 163 (1987).
65 The WTO Agreement preamble refers to "sustainable development." WTO Agreement
pmbl. A reasonable interpretation is that this refers to the concept developed in the
Brundtland Report; while this ambiguous concept means different things to different people,
sustainable economic development is generally accepted as constituting a core aspect of the
term. See WORLD COMM'N. ON ENV'T. & DEV., Our Common Future (1987).
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assessing the appropriateness of special and differential treatment as a
policy. Applying the needs test and the economic impact test produce
different results in different agreements and in different economic contexts.
Both the needs test and the economic impact test involve economic
analysis.6 6 For example, determining the needs of developing countries in
the context of pharmaceutical patents requires an analysis of disease
prevalence and purchasing power. Determining the economic impact of
compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals involves an assessment of the
value of the market to the patent holder. Both tests also involve legal
analysis. Both spring from the treaty text. How they play out will vary
with the wording and the context of each provision that is analyzed. For
example, paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause specifies the developing
country needs that are to be taken into account when developed countries
design preferential schemes. 67 In order to determine the economic impact
of a particular provision, its legal effect must be determined. Thus, the
correct interpretation of a particular WTO provision will require a
combination of legal and economic analysis.68
Special and differential treatment rules are not the only WTO
provisions in which the needs of developing countries can be taken into
account. A closely related issue is how the uniform application of other
WTO rules may produce different results depending on the level of
economic development enjoyed by a particular WTO member. Does the
uniform application of WTO rules, irrespective of variations in
development, give effect to the rules in a way that meets the needs of
developing countries? Put another way, do variations in development levels
need to be taken into account in order to ensure that WTO rules are
66 For a useful overview of the pros and cons of applying different kinds of economic
analysis to different areas of international law, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman,
Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1999).
67 Differential and More Favorable Treatment, supra note 51, 3(c) ("Any differential
and more favorable treatment provided under this clause ... (c) shall in the case of such
treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to developing countries be designed
and, if necessary, modified, to respond positively to the development, financial and trade
needs of developing countries.")
68 Support for this proposition can also be found in the use of economic modeling to
determine the level of retaliation permitted under the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 22.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS -
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. See WTO
Decision by the Arbitrator Concerning United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/ARB/BRA (Brazil Compl.), WT/DS234/ARB/CAN (Canada
Compl.), WT/DS217/ARB/CHL (Chile Compl.), WT/DS217/ARB/EEC (European
Communities Compl.), WT/DS217/ARB/IND (India Compl.), WT/DS217/ARB/JAP (Japan
Compl.), WT/DS217/ARB/KOR (Korea Compl.), WT/DS234/ARB/MEX (Mexico Compl.)
(Aug. 31, 2004).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 26:1 (2005)
effective in achieving the objective(s) of a given rule (which may
encompass more that just the objective of economic development in
developing countries)? Must all WTO rules be effective for all WTO
members?
Applying an effectiveness test, in addition to the needs test and the
economic impact test, is consistent with the rules of treaty interpretation.
The rule of effective treaty interpretation is a corollary of the general rule of
treaty interpretation in Vienna Convention Article 31 .69 According to the
rule of effective treaty interpretation, an interpreter is not free to adopt a
reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a
treaty to redundancy or inutility.7 ° Put another way, it is the duty of any
treaty interpreter to "read all applicable provisions of a treaty in a way that
gives meaning to all of them, harmoniously.",71 A treaty's interpretation
must give effect to its provisions. A logical extension of this rule of
interpretation is that the interpretation must give effect to the provision for
not just some members, but for all of them. It is reasonable to conclude that
the parties to a treaty intend its provisions to be effective for all. Thus, if
the text supports an interpretation that makes a provision effective for all,
then that interpretation should be preferred over one that does not.72 Thus,
testing the interpretation of an ambiguous provision for its effectiveness in
achieving special and differential treatment objectives is "in accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.,
73
Thus, there are three factors that should be taken into account in
interpreting or designing special and differential treatment provisions to
make them operational and effective. The first two factors reflect the
objectives of the WTO Agreement preamble and TRIPS, while the third
springs from a customary rule of interpretation of public international law:
(1) Development needs (TRIPS preamble and WTO Preamble);
(2) Economic impact (TRIPS Article 7 and WTO Preamble); and
(3) Effectiveness.
Taken together, these three factors or tests create an interdisciplinary
69 Vienna Convention, supra note 56, at art. 31.
70 See WTO Appellate Body Report Concerning United States - Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline WT/DS2/AB/R, 35 I.L.M. 276 (Apr. 29, 1996).
71 See WTO Appellate Body Report Concerning Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure
on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, at 81, WT/DS98/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999).
72 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Eighteenth
Session, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 219 ("When a treaty is open to two interpretations
one of which does and the other does not enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good
faith and the objects and purposes of the treaty demand that the former interpretation should
be adopted.")
73 DSU, supra note 68, at art. 3.2.
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approach to the analysis of WTO law and policy. What these tests share in
common is that they all seek to answer the same fundamental question-
does the law, as interpreted or designed, achieve its stated objective(s) in
both the legal and economic contexts?
The objectives of TRIPS must be understood in light of the overall
objectives of the WTO Agreement relating to developing countries. The
relationship between these two sets of objectives should be harmonious, in
light of the principle of effective treaty interpretation and the presumption
against conflicts in international law.
Two core objectives of TRIPS are to achieve a balance between the
rights of producers and users of intellectual property and to promote
development. There are a number of TRIPS provisions that support an
approach to balancing TRIPS rights and obligations that differs with the
level of development of the member in question. The objectives of TRIPS
are to promote "technological innovation ... to the mutual advantage of
producers and users ... in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 74  Under TRIPS
principles, WTO members may "adopt measures necessary to protect!ublic
health ... provided that such measures are consistent with [TRIPS]." The
TRIPS preamble seeks "effective and adequate protection of intellectual
property rights," while recognizing the developmental objectives of
intellectual property protection and the special needs of least-developed
countries for "maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of
laws.",76 These provisions reflect the concerns of developing countries in
the Uruguay Round negotiations that earlier drafts of TRIPS did not
adequately address, including the questions of the balance of the rights and
obligations of rights holders, developmental concerns and public policy
objectives. These concerns were reflected in the preamble so that they
could be taken into account in the interpretation of the agreement.77
The WTO Agreement provides that: "The least-developed countries
recognized as such by the United Nations will only be required to undertake
commitments and concessions to the extent consistent with their individual
development, financial and trade needs or their administrative and
institutional capabilities. 78 The Decision on Measures in Favor of Least-
74 TRIPS art. VII.
75 Id. at art. VIII. In Canada - Term of Patent Protection, the Appellate Body noted that
its ruling did not in any way prejudge "the applicability of Article 7 or Article 8 of the
TRIPS Agreement in possible future cases with respect to measures to promote the policy
objectives of the WTO members that are set out in those Articles. Those Articles still await
appropriate interpretation .... WTO Appellate Body Report Concerning Canada - Term of
Patent Protection, at 101, WT/DS 170/AB/R (Sept. 18, 2000).
76 TRIPS pmbl.
77 See Note by the Secretariat, supra note 12, 14.
78 WTO Agreement art. XI.
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Developed Countries leaves no doubt that this aspect of differential
treatment applies to TRIPS and repeats the language from above:
if not already provided for in the instruments negotiated in the course of
the Uruguay Round, notwithstanding their acceptance of these
instruments, the least-developed countries ... will only be required to
undertake commitments and concessions to the extent consistent with
their individual development, financial and trade needs or their
administrative and institutional capabilities.79
The WTO Agreement preamble also makes special reference to the needs of
developing countries, "especially the least developed among them., 80 The
reference to sustainable development in the WTO Preamble provides
further support for the view that TRIPS should be interpreted in a manner
that supports the development needs of the developing and least-developed
countries. While the term sustainable development has received a great
deal of attention with respect to its role in balancing trade and
environmental protection, 1 economic development is also an important
aspect of sustainable development.
These provisions support the view that the balance to be struck
between producers and users should shift in favor of developing and least-
developed countries when they are the users under consideration. While the
Uruguay Round negotiations on TRIPS rejected country-by-country
transition periods, several members were of the view that the balance of
rights between producers and users of intellectual property should take the
needs of developing countries into account8 2 and that transition periods
alone were not enough to meet their needs.83 Moreover, the promotion of
innovation through the intellectual property regime was not an objective in
and of itself but rather was a means of attaining other economic and social
79 Decision on Measures in Favor of Least-Developed Countries, art. 1, Apr. 14 1994,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - URUGUAY ROUND MINISTERIAL DECISIONS AND DECLARATIONS
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 136 (1994).
80 WTO Agreement pmbl.
81 The WTO Appellate Body noted the use of the term sustainable development in the
WTO Preamble in its interpretation of GATT Article XX(g) to support the use of trade
measures to achieve environmental protection. See WTO Appellate Body Report Concerning
United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 834 (1998) (appealing Panel Report,
WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998)); WTO Appellate Body Report Concerning United States -
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 by
Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) (appealing Panel Report, WT/DS58/RW (June
15, 2001)).
82 It is not specified which "several members" supported this view. See Note by the
Secretariat, supra note 12, 13.
83 Id. 37.
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objectives. Existing international intellectual property conventions
respected this and the fact that the relative costs and benefits of the
protection on intellectual property rights varied from country to country
depending on the level of economic development.84 In order for special and
differential treatment to be effective in meeting the needs of developing
countries, the correct balance must differ from one market to the next,
rather than be universally applicable without regard to the conditions
existing in each market. The absence of internationally agreed criteria that
determine the needs of each country at different levels of economic and
technological development makes this difficult to achieve. However, the
context of specific provisions and agreements provide guidance regarding
the criteria that would be appropriate.
When read together, the objectives of TRIPS and the WTO Agreement
integrate into TRIPS the twin themes of balancing intellectual property
rights against development needs and providing differential treatment based
on the level of development of WTO members. There is no inherent
conflict between the objectives of the WTO Agreement and the specific
objectives of TRIPS.
TRIPS permits flexibility in the manner in which its provisions are
implemented in domestic legal systems. TRIPS Article 1 provides that
"Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing [TRIPS] provisions within their own legal system and
practice." The appropriateness of a particular legal system in a given
market depends on the conditions prevailing in that market.85  In the
following section, we argue that patent laws, like legal systems in general,
will be more effective in promoting innovation and economic development
where their design, interpretation and implementation take into account
prevailing conditions on a market-by-market basis.
IV. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PATENTS AND THEIR EFFECT ON
DEVELOPMENT NEEDS
In the context of drug patents, striking the right balance between the
rights of producers and users requires an analysis of development needs and
economic impact to determine whether patent rights (the rights of
producers) or compulsory licensing rights (one of the rights of users) are
more effective in promoting innovation that meets the needs of developing
countries. This raises economic issues regarding the effect that patents have
on innovation and economic development and whether drug patents are
conducive to social and economic welfare.
4 Id. 15.
85 Benito Arrufada & Veneta Andonova, Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking, in
HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 229-50 (C. Mnard & M. Shirley, eds.,
2005).
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The argument for patent rights in developing countries is based on
several assumptions regarding the general economic impact of patents and
the specific economic impact of patents in developing countries: (1)
technological innovation promotes economic growth; (2) patent rights are
necessary to provide research incentives to spur technological innovation;
(3) patents in developing countries will provide research incentives to create
technological innovations that serve the needs of developing countries; (4)
patent rights in developing countries are necessary to promote the transfer
of technological innovations from firms in developed countries and to
promote technological innovation in developing countries; and (5)
technology transfer to developing countries promotes economic growth in
developing countries.
The theoretical foundation for drug patents lies in the economic
argument that monopoly rights are necessary to spur innovation in the
86pharmaceutical field. In essence, this argument states that, without
patents, the invention of new pharmaceuticals would cease, making the
issue of affordable access to medicine a moot point. This argument is
normally used by pharmaceutical companies to make the case for any
drug.87 In particular, the argument has been put forward for HIV/AIDS
drugs.
88
However, the economic issues are different for global diseases
(diseases that are prevalent in both developed and developing countries,
such as HIV/AIDS) and neglected diseases (developing country diseases
that are not prevalent in developed countries, such as malaria). This is
because the markets for drugs that treat the diseases are different.
86 For example, paragraph 3 of the TRIPS Declaration makes reference to the effect of
patent rights on research incentives as follows: "We recognize that intellectual property
protection is important for the development of new medicines. We also recognize the
concerns about its effects on prices." TRIPS Declaration 3.
87 The thrust of the argument has been articulated in this document of the pharmaceutical
industry:
Innovators in all industries rely on patents to ensure that their inventions are protected and
that they will be given an opportunity to recover their research investments. Strong
intellectual property protection is essential for the preservation and growth of the research-
based pharmaceutical industry - and thus for the continuing development of new and better
medicines for patients. The reason is simple: no company would be able to invest the huge
amount of time and money it takes to discover and develop a new medicine if the drug could
be immediately copied and marketed at a greatly reduced cost by a competitor with no R&D
expenses to recover.
PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
PROFILE 30 (2002), available at http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/profile02/
industryprofile2002.pdf [hereinafter PHRMA INDUSTRY PROFILE].
88 Id.
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In some cases, it may be difficult to determine whether a disease is
global or neglected. For example, HIV/AIDS straddles both the developed
world and the developing world, which suggests that it is best characterized
as a global disease. However, the types of HIV infection found commonly
in the developing and the developed worlds are not the same. There are
many subtypes of HIV-1 (the most commonly occurring HIV infection in
humans). The HIV-1 subtypes accounting for most infections in Africa are
subtype C in southern Africa, subtypes A and D in eastern Africa, and a
circulating recombinant form 02_AG (CRF02AG) in west-central Africa.
89
On the other hand, the most commonly occurring form of HIV-1 in North
America (and in Europe) is subtype B. The drugs developed are more
effective against HIV-1 subtype B. Thus, the sub-types prevailing in
developing countries can be characterized as neglected diseases. Moreover,
HIV/AIDS drugs primarily serve the developed country markets. It is
estimated that 98% of the revenue for drugs for combating HIV/AIDS come
from the OECD countries.90
In the following sections, we consider various economic arguments for
and against the use of patents to stimulate innovation in treatments for
neglected and global diseases. The focus of our analysis in this section is
on the issue of whether global pharmaceutical patents are necessary to
create research incentives to treat neglected and global diseases in
developing countries. 9'
A. Are global patents necessary to provide research incentives for neglected
diseases?
One of the reasons proffered for having global patents is that a global
patent system will provide research incentives for the development of drugs
for neglected diseases.92 According to this view, the reason these diseases
89 M. Peeters & P.M. Sharp, Genetic Diversity of HIV-J:The Moving Target, 14 A.I.D.S.
S 129, S 129-30 (3d Supp. 2000).
90 Jean 0. Lanjouw, A Patent Policy Proposal for Global Diseases (The Brookings
Institution, Working Paper No. 84, 2001), available at http://www.brook.edu/views/papers/
lanjouw/2001061 1.htm (June 11, 2001).
91 It is important to note that this issue is distinct from the issues of whether global patent
rights lead to differential pricing (Ramsey pricing) and how regulatory capture affects
research incentives; both issues that have been treated elsewhere in the literature. Regarding
the former, see F.M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented
Medicines in Developing Countries, 5 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 913 (2002). Regarding the latter,
see WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW (2004). For a recent extension of the Ramsey Pricing model, see also
William Jack & Jean 0. Lanjouw, Financing Pharmaceutical Innovation: How Much Should
Poor Countries Contribute? (Cntr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 28, 2003), available
at http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/2762.
92 For example, the pharmaceutical industry argues that:
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have been "neglected" by the pharmaceutical industry is due to the general
absence of effective patent protection in developing countries prior to the
implementation of TRIPS.
Another argument is that the risk of compulsory licensing makes
developing countries unattractive for the pharmaceutical industry, even with
global patent rights in place. The risk of losing their entire potential profits
in developing countries makes it unattractive for the pharmaceutical
companies to develop drugs for any disease - in particular for neglected
diseases. 93 However, WTO rules-and national legislation in markets such
as the United States-permit compulsory licensing. The risk of compulsory
licensing in the United States has not deterred investment in the U.S.
market. Moreover, WTO rules require compensation for the patent holder
when compulsory licenses are issued.
94
There are several arguments against global patents. Even with patent
protection in developing countries, their markets lack the purchasing power
needed to spur private investment in treatments for neglected diseases. Of
the 1,393 new chemical entities marketed between 1975 and 1999, only
sixteen were for tropical diseases and tuberculosis, i.e. diseases no longer
found in developed countries.95 Of the annual health-related research and
development worldwide in 1999, only 0.2% was for pneumonia, diarrheal
diseases and tuberculosis-yet these account for 18% of the global disease
burden.96 These statistics indicate that the advent of TRIPS has not created
Patent protection has become an important component of the World Trade Organization's
trade rules. Strong intellectual property protection not only benefits patients, it also helps
developing nations by improving the conditions for investment, encouraging the growth of
local industry, and providing consumers with a wider selection of goods and services.
PHRMA INDUSTRY PROFILE, supra note 87, at 34 (emphasis added).
93 The pharmaceutical industry argues that:
Regardless of the stage of a country's economic development, compulsory licensing impedes
the availability of new medications because, under the threat of a compulsory license,
pharmaceutical companies are hesitant to invest R&D or other resources in such countries.
For example when Canada implemented legislation in the 1970s that broadly permitted
compulsory licensing with little compensation for patent holders, investment in
pharmaceutical research and development declined sharply and fewer new products were
introduced in Canada. Not until Canada restored full patent protection, and made
compulsory licensing subject to the conditions in the TRIPS Agreement, did the research-
based pharmaceutical industry begin to reinvest in Canada.
PHRMA INDUSTRY PROFILE, supra note 87, at 37.
" TRIPS art. 31(h).
95 Patrice Trouiller, et al., Drug Development for Neglected Diseases: A Deficient Market
and a Public-Health Policy Failure, 359 THE LANCET 2188 (2002).
96 U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1999), available at
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adequate research incentives by itself. Only time will tell whether this trend
will continue.
Nevertheless, there is another argument against the necessity of global
patents. Patents do not provide an incentive for innovation even where
there is adequate purchasing power in the market.97  An "intellectual
monopoly" approach to patent rights has the effect of stifling innovation
because it provides an incentive to patent holders to invest in legal action to
extend the life of their patents and to prevent others from developing new
innovations. In economic terms, patents provide rights to the person first in
the door of the patent office. This is an inefficient way of allocating
economic resources. This has led many economists to believe that there is
no inherent reason for patent protection.98 Historical evidence favors this
view. 99
B. Are global patents necessary to provide research incentives for global
diseases?
The argument in favor of global patents for global diseases is as
follows. Developed country markets will be undermined through parallel
imports unless patents are global, even if developed countries prohibit
parallel imports. Prohibitions on illegal recreational drugs (such as cocaine
or marijuana) are not effective in preventing their import and sale on black
markets. The same would be true for pharmaceutical products.'00
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1999/en/.
97 Michele Boldrin & David Levine, The Case Against Intellectual Property, 92 AM.
ECON. REV. 209, 210 (2002). See also THE DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES WORKING
GROUP, A Survey of Private Sector Drug Research and Development, in FATAL IMBALANCE:
THE CRISIS IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES 171
(2001); Robert A. Book, Public Research Funding and Private Innovation: The Case of the
Pharmaceutical Industry (Dec. 10, 2003) (manuscript, on file with author); Danny Quah,
24/7 Competitive Innovation (May 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author),
available at http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/dquah/p/0204-247-2pp.pdf.
98 For example, Suzanne Scotchmer notes that "[tihere is no economic rationale for
protecting inventors per se." SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TREATIES 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
9114, 2003). We are indebted to Suzanne Scotchmer of the Department of Economics,
University of California-Berkeley for providing us with this reference.
99 For example, in the draft of Chapter 1 of "The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly,"
the authors forcefully put forward the case of how James Watt (of steam engine fame)
managed to set back the clock of the industrial revolution by lobbying for and getting his
monopoly extended. Boldrin & Levine, supra note 97, at ch. 1. For a discussion of how the
early American growth was fuelled by simply ignoring the European intellectual property
laws, see B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND
COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2005).
100 "There is widespread concern that reimportation schemes are inherently unsafe. Such
plans would endanger public health; increase the supply of counterfeit, contaminated, and
mislabeled drugs, and probably not even save money as intended." PHRMA INDUSTRY
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However, drugs to treat potentially fatal diseases are not the same as
recreational drugs. Fake recreational drugs (most often) do not harm the
user's life. Fake drugs for HIV/AIDS (or other diseases) will. Most
patients will not be willing to risk their lives buying pharmaceuticals on the
black market that have potentially lethal consequences. We do not see drug
dealers selling HIV/AIDS drug cocktails on the street comers of the United
States, even though generic HIV/AIDS drug cocktails can be bought in
developing countries for the tenth of the price that one has to pay in
developed countries. Black markets for parallel imports of pharmaceuticals
are unlikely.
An argument against global patents is that developed country markets
provide sufficient incentives to invent drugs to treat global diseases, thus
making developing country patents unnecessary. The case of treatments for
HIV/AIDS supports this view. Global patents were not necessary to create
research incentives to invent treatments, but global patents have impeded
affordable access to treatment in developing countries. TRIPS permits
WTO members to determine whether to allow parallel imports. 10 1
Therefore, patent laws in developing countries should focus on increasing
affordable access to treatment, not research incentives. Global patents
impede affordable access by reducing price competition.
Moreover, global patents have stifled innovation in HIV/AIDS
treatment regimens. In markets served by patented drugs, the regimen
requires a large number of pills taken three times a day. In contrast, in
markets served by generic drugs, both the number of pills and the number
of daily doses have been reduced. This innovation on the part of the
generic manufacturers has simplified treatment for patients in countries
where the patents are not in force, in addition to lowering the price of
treatment considerably. 10 2 This provides further support for the argument
against global patents, whether for neglected or global diseases.
We conclude that global patents are neither necessary for the
development of drugs for global diseases nor for neglected diseases. The
effect that patents have on innovation and economic development in
developing countries is not conducive to their social and economic needs.
Thus, uniform application of TRIPS obligations regarding drug patents is
unlikely to be effective in promoting innovation that meets the needs of
developing countries.
PROFILE, supra note 87, at 30.
101 TRIPS art. 6.
102 See Shankar Vedantam, Foreign Drugs Approved For Anti-AIDS Program: Decision
Means Treatment for More, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2005, at A10.
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V. MAKING TRIPS PATENT RULES EFFECTIVE IN ACHIEVING
ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES
Drug patents have neither a positive economic impact on developing
countries nor meet their development needs. They have the opposite effect.
The lack of affordable and effective access to medical treatment has a
negative impact on development. Several measures of development are
affected by HIV/AIDS, including GDP per capita, economic growth,
education, life expectancy, and health. Indeed, Peter Piot, the executive
director of the United Nations HIV/AIDS program, has stated that
"[c]ountries like Botswana ... risk becoming what I would call
'undeveloping' because of HIV/AIDS."' 0 3 Thus, if patents decrease access
to life-saving medicines in developing countries, the impact on their
development needs will be negative and defeat the objectives of the WTO.
The result is that TRIPS obligations regarding patent rights are not
effective in meeting the objectives of the WTO Agreement and TRIPS.
There are two possible solutions to this problem. A solution is to use the
exceptions in TRIPS to achieve a better balance between the rights of users
and producers until the patent obligations can be eliminated. This might be
achieved through an interpretation of an amendment to Article 31. The first
part of this section will examine specific Article 31 exceptions in that
context. A better solution is to eliminate the obligation of developing
countries to provide patent rights for pharmaceutical products, through
waivers for developing countries (whose transition period has ended under
TRIPS Article 65) and extending transition periods for least-developed
countries (an option that is contemplated in TRIPS Article 66). This
solution has been partly achieved for least-developed countries, whose
obligations to protect pharmaceutical patents have been delayed until 2016.
The second part of this section will propose an index that can be used to
determine the circumstances in which patent obligations should be waived
for developing countries whose obligations are already in force104 or to
103 No indication AIDS epidemic leveling off, UN says, July 7, 2002, at
http://www.globeandmail.com. Most studies estimate that AIDS epidemics in the worst hit
countries have caused an annual loss of about 1% in per capita GDP. Clive Bell, Hans
Gersbach and Shanta Devarajan challenge this view, arguing that the long-term impact on
economic growth is much greater because of the impact on human capital of the disruption
in the transmission of knowledge from one generation to the next and the impact on
education. See Epidemics and Economics, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 12, 2003, at 69.
104 The procedure for waiving WTO obligations is set out in the WTO Agreement Article
IX. In exceptional circumstances, the Ministerial Conference may decide to waive an
obligation imposed on a member by the WTO Agreement or any of the Multilateral Trade
Agreements. A request for a waiver concerning the Multilateral Trade Agreements must
initially be submitted for consideration by the relevant Council, which then submits a report
to the Ministerial Conference. In the interval between Ministerial Conferences, the WTO
General Council may approve waivers.
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extend transition periods further for least-developed countries.105 Both are
needed as part of the solution proposed in this article because TRIPS
contemplates extending the transition period for least-developed countries,
but not for developing countries. Moreover, the transition period for
developing countries has ended, leaving waivers as the only mechanism to
use to suspend their patent obligations.
Another option is to advocate an interpretation through the dispute
settlement process of the WTO. However, this option is unappealing for
three reasons. First, it would require waiting for a dispute to come before
the dispute settlement body that raises the right issues. Second, even if this
were to occur and the WTO Panel or Appellate Body were to adopt the
advocated interpretation, the interpretation would be legally binding only
for the parties to the dispute. Third, ambiguous treaty language should not
be used to resolve a normative policy issue that is still a matter of
unresolved political debate. Thus, other WTO decision-making mechanisms
are preferable.
A. Solving the Problem through Interpretation or Amendment
Where TRIPS provisions are sufficiently ambiguous to be susceptible
to an interpretation that resolves the issue of special and differential
treatment, an official interpretation would be feasible.10 6 However, where
there is insufficient ambiguity, reforms are better addressed through the
amendment process. 0 7 This section briefly considers the degree of
ambiguity in Article 31 in this context, rather than engaging in a detailed
105 The WTO used a "decision" to extend the transition period for least-developed
countries to 2016 for pharmaceutical patents. See supra note 50. As a general rule, the WTO
is required to continue the GATT practice of "decision-making by consensus," which is
defined as "no Member, present at the meeting when the decision is taken, formally
object[ing] to the proposed decision." As a general rule, where a decision cannot be reached
by consensus, the matter is decided by vote. A simple majority of WTO members may issue
Decisions under the WTO Agreement. See WTO Agreement art. IX: 1.
106 WTO Agreement Article IX:2 gives the Ministerial Conference and the General
Council "exclusive authority to adopt interpretations" of the WTO Agreement and
Multilateral Trade Agreements. With respect to Annex 1 agreements (goods, services and
intellectual property rights), interpretations must be based on a recommendation of the
Council overseeing the particular agreement. The decision to adopt an interpretation must be
taken by a three-fourths majority of the Members (though, as noted above, the preference is
to take decisions by consensus). However, this mechanism cannot be used in place of the
WTO amendment procedures. Thus, this procedure may only be used to clarify provisions
that are otherwise ambiguous, not to create new obligations or exceptions.
107 Under WTO Agreement Article X, decisions to amend provisions of the Multilateral
Trade Agreements can be adopted through approval either by all members or by a two-thirds
majority, depending on the nature of the provision concerned. Amendments only take effect
for those WTO members who accept them. However, in order to maintain the consistency of
WTO obligations, amendment decisions should be taken by consensus.
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analysis. There is already a great deal of literature addressing how TRIPS
Article 31 can be interpreted in ways favorable to developing countries.
This section is limited to the point that interpretation is not the best route to
follow in introducing objective criteria for applying situational flexibility to
compulsory licensing exceptions.
In the context of patent provisions in TRIPS, the rights conferred on
patent owners in Article 28(1) and 33 are expressed in unambiguous
terms.108 The lack of ambiguity in this treaty text makes it difficult to take
special and differential treatment into account through interpretation. As
noted earlier, Articles 30 and 31 authorize exceptions to TRIPS patent
rights, and while Article 30 permits "limited exceptions," Article 31 is
broader and provides a right to make other use of the subject matter of the
patent without the authorization of the right holder.
Article 31 permits WTO members to allow "other use of the subject
matter of the patent" and covers compulsory licensing of patents. The term
"other use" means "use other than that allowed under Article 30."'109 The
language in this provision is more ambiguous than the language in Articles
28 and 33. Thus, the rule of effective treaty interpretation might be applied
to take the circumstances of the WTO member invoking Article 31 rights
into account to ensure that the right is effective for that member in a
specific case. Subsection (a) of Article 31 requires that a given
authorization "be considered on its individual merits."
Subsection (b) provides that other use may only be permitted if "the
proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder
on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have
not been successful within a reasonable period of time." This provision
contains sufficient ambiguity to be open to different interpretations. The
needs of a developing country in a particular case might be taken into
account to determine whether (1) the efforts are adequate, (2) whether the
commercial terms and conditions are reasonable, and (3) what constitutes a
reasonable period of time. Interpreting these three conditions in light of the
objectives of the WTO Agreement and TRIPS means that the standard
could vary with the level of economic development of the country invoking
the right and the circumstances in which the right is invoked. For example,
if the right is invoked to increase the affordability of medical treatment for a
developing country disease (which could be a neglected disease or a global
disease), the development needs of the country and the economic impact of
expanding access to treatment should be taken into account to make access
to the right effective. A similar analysis can be applied to the scope and
duration of the use under subsection (c) and what constitutes adequate
remuneration under subsection (h).
108 See TRIPS arts. 28, 33.
109 Id. at n.7.
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Given the ambiguity of several subsections in Article 31 and the
availability of arguments that support taking into account the needs of
developing countries, an official interpretation might be used as the vehicle.
However, given the need to negotiate criteria and the proviso that
interpretations not be used to amend an agreement, it is a less satisfactory
alternative than an amendment.
However, an amendment to Article 31 that would facilitate the use of
compulsory licensing in developing and least-developed countries is
another alternative. The aim of such an amendment would be to make
Article 31 sufficiently flexible to vary the balance between the rights of
producers and users of patented drugs on a market-by-market basis. This
solution is problematic. It would be difficult to implement situational
flexibility in a manner that would provide both certainty and flexibility,
particularly with respect to the issue of what would constitute adequate
compensation for the patent holder in specific cases. Moreover, the
adequacy of compensation is a complex issue that is addressed in national
courts, not the WTO.1 0 Determining whether compensation is adequate
through litigation is an uncertain and expensive process."' In contrast,
eliminating patent obligations for drugs altogether through waivers or the
extension of the transition period on a market-by-market basis provides
legal certainty and is far easier to implement on a case-by-case basis. In the
following section, we propose a set of criteria to be applied to determine the
circumstances in which obligations should be suspended for pharmaceutical
patents in a given market for a given medicine.
B. Eligibility for Exemption from Patent Obligations
Determining the correct balance between producers and users of
patented products using the current breakdown of WTO members into the
three categories of developed, developing and least-developed countries is
110 TRIPS permits the process for calculating remuneration to differ from one WTO
member to the next. See supra note 29. For example, in the United States, courts use a
fifteen factor test to assess damages for reasonable royalties. See, e.g., Gargoyles, Inc. v.
United States, 113 F.3d 1572, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.,
318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified & affd, 446 F.2d 295, 302 (2d Cir.
1971).
11 Under U.S. jurisprudence, the correct measure of compensation is "what the owner
has lost, not what the taker has gained." Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 969
(Ct. Cl. 1979) (cited with approval in Gargoyles, 113 F.3d at 1575); Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1571-72, (Fed. Cir. 1996). However, it is not clear whether the
same standard applies in Section 1498 cases, which involve the government. See Gargoyles,
113 F.3d at 1575; Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 349 (Ct. CI. 1977) ("[I]f
lost profits are ever to be awarded under Section 1498, it should be only after the strictest
proof that the patentee would actually have earned and retained those sums in its sales to the
Government.") Since TRIPS permits the process for calculating remuneration to differ from
one WTO member to the next, uncertainty increases in the international context.
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overly simplistic and inappropriate in the context of pharmaceutical patents.
This article proposes a more sophisticated categorization of the WTO
membership in the form of an index that can be used to achieve a more
equitable balance between the rights of producers and users on a market-by-
market basis. This proposal is grounded on economic considerations and
takes into account the need to apply a systematic standard to determine the
particular needs of developing countries set out in the WTO Agreement or
in multilateral instrumnents adopted by international organizations.' 12 This
section offers a step by step guide for permitting a country to waive or
delay patent protection using a multidimensional approach. The method
recognizes the needs of a country not just based on its level of poverty, but
also on a threshold level of infection rate of a particular disease.
A difficult issue is how to determine the cut-off point with respect to
economic development in the case of developing countries." 3 The WTO
recognizes as least-developed countries those countries that have been
designated as such by the United Nations.1 14 A country like Brazil does not
qualify as a least-developed country. Nevertheless, a country's level of
development will affect the balance between research incentives and
affordable access even in the case of a developing country like Brazil
because the value of its market influences the evaluation of the impact of
compulsory licenses on research incentives. For this reason, we propose a
112 See EC TariffPreferences, supra note 53, 163.
113 There are no WTO definitions of "developed" or "developing" countries. Members
can announce for themselves whether they are developing countries. However, this does not
automatically provide rights. Other members can challenge the announcement, which has
happened in the area of intellectual property. This challenge can then lead to negotiations to
clarify the position. For countries that joined the WTO after 1995, their status depends on the
agreed terms from the accessions negotiations. See Guglielmo Verdirame, The Definition of
Developing Countries under GATT and Other International Law, 39 GERMAN Y.B. OF INT'L.
L. 164 (1996).
114 Article XI:2 of the WTO Agreement recognizes as least-developed countries those
designated as such by the United Nations. It provides that such countries "will only be
required to undertake commitments and concessions to the extent consistent with their
individual development, financial and trade needs or their administrative and institutional
capabilities." There are currently fifty least-developed countries on the U.N. list; to date
thirty-two have become WTO Members. These are: Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi,
Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Solomon Islands, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. Twelve additional least-
developed countries are in the process of accession to the WTO. They are: Afganistan,
Bhutan, Cape Verde, Equitorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Laos, Nepal, Samoa, Sdo Tom6 and
Principe, Sudan, Vanuatu and Yemen. See UN Office of the High Representative for the
Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing
States, List of Least Developed Countries, at http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/
list.htm (Nov. 3, 2005) [hereinafter LDC List]; WTO, Members and Observers, at
http://www.wto.org/ english/thewto-e/whatise/tife/org6_e.htm (Feb. 2005).
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more sophisticated approach to balancing the rights of producers and users.
Least-developed countries are officially designated as such by the
United Nations General Assembly on the basis of a number of criteria,
including: low national income (per capita GDP) under $900 million for
countries now joining the list); low levels of human development (a
combined health, nutrition and education index); and economic
vulnerability (a composite index based on indicators of instability,
inadequate diversification and the handicap of small size). The population
of countries that meet all the other criteria for admission to the category
must not exceed 75 million inhabitants.' 15
This definition provides an inadequate measure for determining the
correct balance between producers and users of patented drugs. Consider
the case of HIV/AIDS. Using above criteria, a middle-income country with
a high rate of HIV/AIDS infection, such as South Africa at 19.94%, would
not qualify for the most favorable level of treatment.1 6 Therefore, we
propose that a different index be used (somewhat similar to the Human
Development Index) to categorize countries and to determine the correct
balance between TRIPS rights and obligations regarding pharmaceutical
patents on a market-by-market basis.'
1 7
It is important to emphasize that we are not proposing that this index
be used regarding other forms of intellectual property or other WTO
agreements. Nor are we proposing that this index be used to justify the
erosion of core non-discrimination obligations. Rather, we propose that this
index be used for the narrow purpose of achieving equality among WTO
115 The formal definition is taken from Press Release, U.N., Third UN Conference on
Least Developed Countries in Brussels: 14-20 May to Confront Economic Isolation of
'Poorest of the Poor,' (May 11, 2001), available at http://rO.unctad.org/conference/press/
devbrul.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
116 The fifty least-developed countries are as follows: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh,
Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic,
Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic
Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique,
Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Lest6, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of
Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia. See LDC List, supra note 114.
117 Of course, researchers do not agree that something more than per capita income is
necessary to determine what should be done about a specific country. For example, Jean
Lanjouw favors the use of per capita GDP only, noting: "It is arguable that a country with
high income unequally distributed should not be given benefits in the form of low drug
prices. Those countries have the resources to deal with poverty domestically." See supra
note 90. In other words, if the income level is high, then the issue should be solved using
some domestic mechanism, like tax-transfer. Email from Jean Lanjouw, to Bradly Condon &
Tapen Sinha (Sept. 29, 2003) (on file with authors). The problem with this approach is that it
is not at all clear how such a mechanism can be engineered before the country slides back
into poverty due to a disease such as HIV/AIDS.
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members with respect to access to medicine to address the HIV/AIDS
pandemic and other public health problems. Finally, while the legal rights
and obligations that flow from the concept of special and differential
treatment for developing countries are far from clear, and the current means
of defining developing and least-developed countries in international law
are inadequate, we are by no means suggesting this index as the appropriate
solution to these highly controversial issues.
There are three specific ingredients to the construction of the index: (1)
disease prevalence; (2) per capita income; and (3) poverty rate.
1. Disease rate
First, a disease has to be above some threshold rate that will be
determined by a world body. Once a country is above that threshold rate
for the specific disease, it will qualify for a waiver (developing countries) or
an extension of the transition period (least-developed countries) with
respect to patent obligations for treatments for that disease. The reason
developing countries would require a waiver is that the TRIPS Agreement
does not contemplate an extension to the transition period for developing
countries, which expired January 1, 2005.
Because this has to be done impartially on a global scale, we need to
decide which world body should decide on the threshold. It seems logical
that the World Health Assembly would be the right forum for making such
a decision. After all, the World Health Assembly is authorized to adopt
regulations on international health matters. But the reality of the World
Health Assembly makes it the wrong forum for the following reason. In its
entire history, it has only adopted two such regulations: (1) Unification of
Statistical Classification of Morbidity and Mortality (in 1948 and
subsequent revisions) and (2) International Sanitary Regulations (in 1951).
Thus, it has not made much progress in setting standards for health-related
matters in the past. Therefore, we could not rely on an international body
that moves at glacial speed on matters that require urgent and speedy
decisions. What about the World Health Organization ("WHO") itself?
Eric Stein, the renowned legal scholar on international law, warns us about
the decision-making by the WHO. He notes that "WHO activities have
been carried out primarily by consensus through nonbinding and less formal
procedures such as recommendations, resolutions, and promulgation of
technical standards."' 18 He also notes that the WHO has failed to set up a
desperately needed legal settlement procedure. 119 In fact, the WHO has
been very politicized. The decision-making processes at the WHO have
118 See Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95
AM. J. INT'L L. 489 (2001).
1 9 Id. at 499.
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been anything but transparent. Therefore, our recommendation is to have
the TRIPS Council decide on the threshold. This raises the obvious
objections that the WTO mandate is limited to trade-related matters and
should not be expanded to include public health issues. However, this
objection seems weak, given the relationship between patents, public
health, and the work that has already been done in this area under the
purview of TRIPS. Indeed, the issue of adopting criteria to implement
special and differential treatment in WTO agreements is already the subject
of negotiations in the Doha Round. Moreover, there is a precedent for the
WTO to negotiate a threshold for addressing the special and differential
treatment of developing countries in the context of a WTO Agreement.120
Suppose the disease rate in a country is denoted by r. Suppose, also
one has agreed upon a threshold of the infection rate of the disease t(r). The
criterion used would be as follows. A country would qualify if the actual
rate of infection prevailing in the country is larger than the agreed upon
threshold value (in symbols, a country would qualify if r > t(r) regardless of
economic development or any other criterion). A high rate of infection
would override every other criterion. The rationale for using this method is
simple. It does not exclude countries that may not qualify because of
otherwise mitigating factors such as a relatively high level of per capita
income. How should the threshold be determined? This should depend on
the disease in question. For infectious diseases, the threshold should be
determined by a level such that with a higher rate, the disease would rapidly
spread. 121
2. Per capita income
Second, one needs to include a country if the income level is low.
This requires a threshold value below which a country would qualify for a
waiver. Once again, the threshold would be determined by a world body (in
this case, the suitable organization would be the World Bank). If a country
has a per capita income 122 below some threshold, it would automatically
120 See WTO Agreement Annex VII (establishing the threshold of GNP per capita of
$1,000 for the application of Article 3.1(a) to the listed countries).
121 A paper by Romualdo Pastor-Satorras and Alessandro Vespignan gives us clues as to
how to determine the threshold. Roughly speaking, the threshold is determined by the
number of "nodes" that allow the spread of the disease. If there are many nodes, the spread
speeds up. In the case of HIV/AIDS, the identifiable nodes are commercial sex workers and
truck drivers. Romualdo Pastor-Satorras and Alessandro Vespignan, Epidemic Dynamics in
Finite Size Scale-Free Networks (Feb. 18, 2002), available at http://arxiv.org/abs/cond-
mat/0202298 (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
122 Here we have left the exact method of determining the value of per capita income
open. Usually, to get comparable per capita income across countries, we convert per capita
income from local currencies (which are not comparable across countries) into some fixed
currency (usually U.S. dollars) on the basis of the exchange rate on a given day. However,
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qualify. The per capita income is denoted by pci and the corresponding
threshold per capita income by t(pci). Expressing in symbols, the criterion
is written as follows: If the per capita income pci < t(pci), then the country
automatically qualifies.
3. Poverty rate
Third, we need to have a mechanism to take into account the poverty
level in the country. One possible candidate could be the average level of
income in the country. Unfortunately, the average income does not do the
job because it papers over the inequality in income among the population.
23
There are different measures of inequality that arepotential candidates.
One commonly-used measure is the Gini coefficient. 2  However, the Gini
coefficient is not affected by a multiplicative factor: If everyone's income
increases by ten-fold, the Gini coefficient is not affected.125 To take a
concrete example, Uganda and the United States have approximately the
same Gini coefficient of income distribution. 26 Thus, the Gini coefficient
would be meaningless as a measure of inequality that can be compared
across countries at a given point in time.
A more appropriate measure of inequality is to include people who are
the current exchange rate does not necessarily reflect the purchasing power of a certain
income in a given country. One way of adjusting for purchasing power is the so-called
Purchasing Power Parity ("PPP") method. The idea for the PPP adjustment is to create an
index by calculating how much a fixed basket of goods and services would cost in different
countries (in local currency) and then adjusting the "value" of one unit of that currency in
terms of U.S. dollars. We are recommending a purchasing power adjustment for per capita
income but not for determining the poverty level threshold. The reason is the following: The
general wellbeing of the population in a given country is determined by how much money
can buy in the country. The use of the poverty level index is meant to capture the
affordability of medicine in the international market, as it is likely that medicines have to be
imported. If the average PPP adjusted income is high, such as in South Africa or in Brazil,
the people who need medicine but cannot afford it will be captured by the threshold measure
of poverty - $1 a day in income.
123 There is an ancient joke that says if you put your head in the oven and your feet in the
freezer, you are comfortable on the average.
124 The most common geometric definition of the Gini coefficient is based on the Lorenz
(or concentration) curve. It represents cumulative income share as a function of cumulative
population share. If a population share is always exactly equal to a share in overall income,
then there is a situation of perfect equality.
125 Technically, the Gini coefficient is a relative measure of inequality.
126 Both are around 38%. The lower the number, the more equal the income. Conversely,
the higher the number, the higher the inequality. Thus, a zero percent Gini coefficient means
everybody in the economy has the same income. On the other hand, 100% value of the Gini
coefficient implies that one person has all the income in the country and everyone else has
zero income. Of course, in real life, neither extreme is observable. In real life, it ranges from
around 25% (for countries such as Belgium, Finland and the Czech Republic) to over 60%
(for countries such as Brazil or Sierra Leone).
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poor in the country in absolute terms. One possibility would be to consider
a threshold of some proportion of people who are below some absolute
measure of poverty level. The rationale is simple. If there are many people
below some absolute poverty level, they cannot afford treatment. A simple
measure (available for most countries around the world) is the proportion of
people in the country who live on $1 or less a day. So, the criterion would
be the following: If the proportion of population (p) with $1 income
exceeds some threshold t(p), then the country would automatically qualify.
In symbols, ifp > t(p), then a country automatically qualifies for a waiver.
Thus, there are three possible indices that could be used for
determining the countries that qualify. The three are combined to arrive at a
single criterion. In plain English, if a country qualifies using any of the
above threshold criteria, it should qualify. The following criterion that
includes all three measures using a compact notation can be used: If
maximum {r - t(r), t(pci) - pci, p - t(p)} > 0, the country qualifies. This
criterion ensures that: If (1) the disease rate (r) is above the pre-determined
threshold (t(r)), then the country qualifies; (2) if the per capita income (pci)
is below the predetermined threshold (t(pci)), then the country qualifies;
and (3) if the proportion of population (p) is above the threshold (t(p)), then
the country qualifies.
Although the measure above is useful, it is not entirely satisfactory.
Suppose a country has all the above problems but it fails each threshold
criterion by some amount and therefore fails to qualify. Clearly, we will
need a method of "adding" each "score" to come up with an aggregate
value that reflects the issue in all three dimensions. There are two ways of
achieving this, which are discussed below.
Let max(r) be the country with the maximum infection rate. Let
min(pci) be the country with minimum per capita income. Let max(p) be
the country with the maximum proportion of people below $1 per day per
capita income. We construct the following absolute index (Absolute
Component Summed Index or Absolute CSI):
Absolute CSI for a country = [r/max(r) + min(pci)/pci + p/max(p)]13
The rationale for the formula is as follows. If a country hits the
maximum infection rate, minimum income level and maximum number of
poor people in the pool of all countries, the CSI will hit a maximum of 1.
We can set a predetermined value of the Absolute CSI such that any
country with the value of the index above that level would qualify for a
waiver.
Since this measure will never hit zero, some people might consider this
measure unsatisfactory. We can adjust that by considering a modified
version that measures different dimensions in relative terms. Thus, we
construct the Relative Component Summed Index:
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Relative CSI for a country = [I(r) + I(pci) + I(p)]!3
where, I(r) = [r - min(r)]/[max(r) - min(r)], I(pci) = [max(pci) -
pci]/[max(pci) - min(pci)] and l(p) = [p - min(p)]/[max(p) - min(p)].
To see why we take such ratios, consider the first one: 1(r). If, for a
given country, the infection rate r is the highest among all countries, then
the index 1(r) = 1. On the other hand, if the infection rate r is the lowest
among all countries, I(r) = 0. Similarly, if the per capita income (pci) is the
lowest among all countries, then the index I(pci) = 1. On the other hand if
the per capita income pci is the highest among all countries, then the index
I(pci) = 0. If the $1 a day population p is the highest among all the
countries in question, then I(p) = 1, whereas if it is the lowest, then I(p) = 0.
Thus, the relative CSI is a measure bounded by 0 and 1 as two extremes.
By construction, the relative CSI could touch the limits for the best case
scenario (it would approach 0) and the worst case scenario (it would
approach 1).127
With the Relative CSI (RCSI), the criterion should specify a threshold
(t): if the RCSI > t, the country should qualify under the composite measure
for the most favorable level of treatment available. To incorporate this
measure in our overall criterion, we propose the following:
If maximum {r - t(r), t(pci) -pci, p - t(p), RCSI - t} > 0, then a country
should qualify for the most favorable level of treatment.
This measure for determining "economic needs" is quite consistent
with the long run interest of the pharmaceutical companies. Consider the
case of Botswana. It was called the "miracle country" of Africa until the
early 1990s. The real GDP of Botswana grew at a rate of 8-9% per year for
more than a decade. However, with the devastating effects of HIV/AIDS,
the country is slowly sinking. The life expectancy at birth has fallen by 10
years. HIV/AIDS is reversing much of the economic gains of the past
decades. If the pharmaceutical industry insists on protection of their drug
patents, it will generate very little profit now. Worse, they will have to
forego all the future growth in profits they might have generated in the
future. Botswana will recede into the backwaters of economic
development.
The use of our index allows these types of countries to return to
127 It should be noted that the country with the worst outcome in terms of Absolute CS
Index ("ACSI") may not be the country with the worst outcome in terms of the Relative CS
Index ("RCSI"). Thus, it is quite probable that in the list of all countries we will never
observe the extreme value 1 for the RCSI. Similarly the country with the best outcome in
RCSI measure may not be the country with the best outcome in ACSI measure. Thus, we
might not observe the extreme value 0 in a sample of countries.
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economic growth. That process should eventually push them over the
threshold value of the index so that they no longer qualify for the waiver.
Without such measures, these countries will be caught in a vicious circle
and, therefore, will never generate the level of purchasing power needed to
create a market for the pharmaceutical industry.
The index allows us to redress this balance of incentives through a
mechanism that is implemented, using objective standards recognized by
international bodies that represent all interested parties. The index serves to
promote affordable access to medicine using criteria that are tailored to
address the specific circumstances surrounding global or neglected diseases,
which is more appropriate than the U.N. measure of least developed or
developing countries.
VI. CONCLUSION
The HIV/AIDS epidemic has sparked a broader debate over the right
balance to strike between the rights of patent holders and the needs of
developing countries. Pharmaceutical companies are concerned about the
precedent that may be set for intellectual property rights as a result of the
measures taken to address HIV/AIDS. However, we conclude that their
concerns are largely unfounded. 128
TRIPS established uniform minimum standards for the protection of
intellectual property rights. At the same time, however, both the WTO
Agreement and TRIPS recognized that vastly different levels of economic
development warranted differential treatment of WTO members, based on
their level of development. The TRIPS Declaration represents a partial
acknowledgement that the differential treatment that was initially set out in
TRIPS was inadequate, by extending the transition period for least-
developed countries and recognizing that WTO members did not enjoy
equal access to patent exceptions due to the lack of manufacturing capacity
in the pharmaceutical sector. The Paragraph 6 Decision further refines how
differential treatment is to operate in practice with respect to compulsory
licensing for export. However, it conditions access to legal rights on the
level of economic development in a manner that does not resolve the
fundamental issue of equal access to legal rights and the access to medicine
that these imply.
Conditioning special and differential treatment in TRIPS based on the
categorization of countries as developed, developing and least-developed,
determining membership in the latter category based on the U.N. method, is
inappropriate when it comes to patents for medicines. This article has
128 For a contrasting view, see Sykes, supra note 2 (arguing that the course charted by the
TRIPS Declaration will encourage developing countries to engage in compulsory licensing
and parallel importation of pharmaceuticals and thus may reduce both pharmaceutical
innovation and access to affordable drugs).
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proposed two alternative methods for rectifying this problem: the first based
on an amendment and the second based on the adoption of objective criteria
to make decisions regarding waivers and extensions of transition periods.
In the context of global and neglected diseases, uniformity of TRIPS
obligations relating to patented medicine impose unnecessarily high costs
on users and poor distribution of costs and benefits among producers and
users of intellectual property. Uniform rules can have disparate effects that
worsen inequalities rather than correct them. To achieve the correct balance
between the rights of producers and users of patented medicine, a broader
range of factors must be taken into account than are currently used in the
WTO and U.N. contexts.
This article has questioned the underlying premise of TRIPS, that
strong global patent rights are necessary to ensure innovation. Even if one
accepts the premise that patents rights are necessary for every WTO
member, regardless of the member's level of development, the proposed
index shows that the U.N. classification of countries is an inappropriate
basis for achieving an equitable balance between the rights of patent owners
and users. The U.N. classification, based solely on per capita income, was
developed for giving economic aid. It was not meant for handling a
complex issue such as HIV/AIDS, which encompasses epidemiological
issues (such as incidence of infection in the population). The proposals set
out in this article take into account the objectives of the WTO Agreement
and TRIPS, and provide a systematic basis for incorporating member-
specific flexibility into TRIPS. It is hoped that these proposals will move
the current WTO negotiations forward in the area of special and differential
treatment for developing countries and dispel the notion that member-
specific flexibility is unworkable in practice.
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